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Design Research, an Oxymoron?
Abstract
Why oxymoron?
An oxymoron is a figure of speech that combines two contradictory terms. The word oxymoron is of Greek
origin. It combines the word oxy (=sharp) and moron (=dull, stupid, foolish). Thus, oxymoron not only names
a contradiction in terms, it is an oxymoron as well. Oxymorons may be used for achieving rhetorical effects, as
in working vacation and uninvited guest. They may also result from conceptual sloppiness, as in extremely
average, original copy, or same difference. Oxymorons may remain unnoticed when the meanings of the
contradictory parts are not distinguished, as in spendthrift, virtual reality, and Artificial Intelligence. Typically,
contradictions of this kind are resolved by taking one term as the inferior attribute of a superior concept. For
example, unbiased opinion is a kind of opinion, accurate estimate is a kind of estimate, and the reply "no
comment" is not taken as a comment.
Oxymorons are not mere linguistic oddities. Words are far from neutral bystanders of what happens in the
world. They can shape their users' perceptions and direct their actions. For this very reason, and to enhance its
academic respectability, the design community has begun to adopt vocabularies from the more established
disciplines, without noticing, I suggest, the implicit importation of paradigms that are essentially alien to it.
One aim of this essay is to show that design research is an oxymoron whose contradictions, because they are
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An oxymoron is a figure of speech that combines two contradictory terms. The word oxymoron is 
of Greek origin. It combines the word oxy (=sharp) and moron (=dull, stupid, foolish). Thus, 
oxymoron not only names a contradiction in terms, it is an oxymoron as well. Oxymorons may be 
used for achieving rhetorical effects, as in working vacation and uninvited guest. They may also 
result from conceptual sloppiness, as in extremely average, original copy, or same difference. 
Oxymorons may remain unnoticed when the meanings of the contradictory parts are not 
distinguished, as in spendthrift, virtual reality, and Artificial Intelligence. Typically, 
contradictions of this kind are resolved by taking one term as the inferior attribute of a superior 
concept. For example, unbiased opinion is a kind of opinion, accurate estimate is a kind of 
estimate, and the reply “no comment” is not taken as a comment. 
Oxymorons are not mere linguistic oddities. Words are far from neutral bystanders of what 
happens in the world. They can shape their users’ perceptions and direct their actions. For this 
very reason, and to enhance its academic respectability, the design community has begun to adopt 
vocabularies from the more established disciplines, without noticing, I suggest, the implicit 
importation of paradigms that are essentially alien to it. One aim of this essay is to show that 
design research is an oxymoron whose contradictions, because they are not obvious to everyone, 
can lead its naïve users into thinking of it as a kind of research similar to what reputable scientists 
do. 
 
What do science researchers (claim they) do? 
Science is said to validate propositions that state facts. Research is the process by which this is 
accomplished, ultimately revealing the nature of what exists from what was observed, starting 
with simple hypotheses, going to more general theories, and ultimately reaching laws of nature. 
Since nature does not talk, the process of uncovering its secrets is not an easy matter. Scientists 
talk among themselves, but their talk is not considered science. Science starts with data – records 
of observations, measurements or texts – that can decide among competing hypotheses and 
validate or invalidate theories concerning them. 
Why are data essential to research? Experiences are hard to study. Happenings come and go away 
like thunderstorms and spoken words. Witnessing historical events, watching a game of sports, or 
being aware of designing something, is not inter-subjectively analysable as such. To be sure that 
our observations are not entirely subjective, irreproducible illusions, scientists rely on other 
scientists who, when agreeing on what they see, are willing to conclude that the phenomena of 
interest existed independent of their subjectivities. Excluding observers’ subjectivities from 
propositions about the observed world is a defining feature of scientific research. However, 
agreement on what happened can be established only if the phenomena of interest have been 
observed jointly and records of them are contemporary in order to be compared side by side and 
examined by many. This is what data are expected to do. They must represent the phenomena of 
interest, survive the conditions that gave rise to them, and remain sufficiently durable to 
withstand their analysis. Researchers take great care to assure themselves and others that their 
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 data are reliable in this sense and worthy of their trust, which means assuring everybody that 
nobody has tampered with them. 
This tangible nature of data is also implied in the uncritical use of metaphors that implicitly 
absolve researchers from the responsibilities for their creation. For example, claiming that data 
were discovered, found, collected, or sampled entails that they were there to begin with and that 
the researcher merely picked them up to look at them. This metaphorical description of how data 
came into the hands of the researcher, and only that, is what makes critical assessments of their 
representativeness unnecessary, assures researchers of having nothing to do with the data they are 
analysing, and justifies describing research results as findings – as if they were merely uncovered 
in or extracted from available data. I will return to this point later. 
But what is research? Fundamentally, it is – just as the English word suggests – re-search, a 
process of repeated searching for patterns that are manifest in available data. In other languages, 
the English research may focus on different aspects of scientific work, for example, the German 
Forschung emphasizes vigorous inquiry into truth, but this too involves recurring searches. 
Scientists are trained to be systematic and careful, systematic by leaving nothing out from what 
was observed, and careful by going through their data, again and again, until they are sure that 
what they find is unquestionably evident, not the result of spurious causes or flighty imagination. 
Re-search involves sorting, rearranging, tabulating, weighting and comparing data in place of the 
phenomena of interest – much like tangible objects can be handled – but systematically. 
Processes of scientific research are institutionalised, which encourages researchers to publish 
their results in the hope that colleagues will confirm their findings, or build on them. 
The re-searched patterns are necessarily simpler and more abstract than the data in which they 
occur. For one thing, re-search findings are stated in language, which cannot but omit what 
escapes the researcher’s vocabulary. But they also ignore details considered irrelevant – 
irrelevant to the researcher’s theory or hypothesis. For example, statistical analyses can extract 
regression equations, clusters, networks or causal chains from available data. What does not fit 
these patterns is considered unexplained variation or noise. Pearson’s product moment correlation 
coefficient, for example, measures the degree to which data conform to a linear relationship 
between two variables. That degree is the ratio of what fits to what fits plus what does not. 
What about predictive theories? We can speculate about the future, but data from the future are 
never presently available. Scientific theories are predictive by generalising patterns found in data 
that are currently available to data that do not yet exist. (Note that predictions anticipate 
additional observations, including, but not exclusively, of future phenomena.) For example, when 
statistical hypotheses are considered, tests of the statistical significance of findings measure the 
generalisability of patterns found in a sample of data to a population of possible data, of which 
the sample was a part. Significance is expressed in probabilistic terms, the probability of the 
continued existence of the observed patterns. This seems entirely unproblematic until we realise 
that predictions (a) are intrinsically conservative by assuming that the patterns observed in the 
past will continue to explain future observations, and (b) leave no space for human agency by 
regarding future observations as necessarily following from past findings. 
Finally, re-search is considered applicable to any subject matter. Scientists re-search the working 
of a machine, just as they study the performance of an economy, a play, or what designers do. 
Consumer researchers may generalize the performance of one product to all products that came 
from the same assembly line. Economists derive their predictions by extrapolating past trends 
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 into the future. Likewise, the theories of design that emerge from observations of what designers 
commonly do account only for what they did, not for how they might redesign the theory they 
were following. It is well established that scientific forecasts of technological developments are 
notoriously unsuccessful, largely because design escapes the conservatism of the re-search 
process – but this foreshadows what will be discussed next. 
 
What do designers do by comparison? 
The etymology of design goes back to the Latin de+signare, marking out, setting apart, giving 
significance by assigning it to a use, user, maker or owner. Sixteenth-century English emphasised 
the purposiveness of design, and because design often involves drawing, or ‘marking out’, while 
17th-century English moved design closer to art. Based on these original meanings, we could say: 
Design is making sense of things (to others) 
The phrase can be read as ‘design is a sense making activity’, claiming perception, experience, 
and perhaps appearance as its fundamental concern, and this reading is quite acceptable. It can 
also mean that ‘the products of design are to make sense to their users’, and this interpretation is 
the central focus of The Semantic Turn [1]. It puts the creation of artefacts for future use by 
others into the centre of all design activities. 
For Herbert Simon, writing 38 years earlier, design is both broader and narrower [2]. He 
suggests: 
‘Everyone designs who devises courses of action aimed at changing existing 
situations into preferred ones. The intellectual activity that produces material 
artefacts is no different fundamentally from the one that prescribes remedies for a 
sick patient or the one that devises a new sales plan for a company or a social 
welfare policy for a state. Design, so construed, is the core of all professional 
training; it is the principal mark that distinguishes the professions from the 
sciences. Schools of engineering, as well as schools of architecture, business, 
education, law, medicine, are all centrally concerned with the process of design.’ 
(pp. 55–56) 
Simon’s account could be a starting point, except – and this may be due to the period in which he 
wrote these lines – he reduces design to rational problem solving, which begins with defining a 
problem in terms of how something ought to function, proceeds to enumerating alternative 
solutions to that problem, and ends with methods of selecting the optimal or satisfactory solution 
from among them. My own experiences lead me to depart from Simon’s rational paradigm in two 
ways. First, I observe that designers, including myself, are motivated in at least three ways, by 
• Challenges, troublesome conditions, problems, or conflicts that have escaped (re)solution. 
Challenges arise from the perception of presently undesirable conditions that seem to defy 
routine improvement. Simon’s problem solving would be one example of this. 
• Opportunities not seen by others to do something, to improve one’s own or other people’s 
lives. Opportunities do not imply the presence of problematic conditions, rather, they offer 
choices to move into something new and exciting without having been a problem at the time. 
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 • Possibilities of introducing variations into the world that others may not realise or do not dare 
to consider. From the perspective of evolution, these variations are random mutations, without 
apparent purpose or plan, and they may prove to be successful or not. Just being different 
moves many poets, painters, and composers. There is no rational explanation for doing 
something different, except perhaps personal satisfaction. 
To me, rational problem solving is just one way of designing and I do not wish to limit design to 
what Horst Rittel et al. call ‘tame problems’ [3]. 
Second and more importantly, the kind of design that occupies my attention is human-centred. If 
design is to encourage artefacts that are meaningful to others, to users or stakeholders, it must at 
least acknowledge, if not support, their conceptions and desires. This requires (a) listening to how 
other people think and justify their actions in worlds they always are in the process of 
constructing to live in, or (b) inviting the stakeholders of a design to participate actively in the 
design process. So conceived, design is an essentially social activity, one that cannot be separated 
or abstracted from the context of people’s lives and certainly not be replaced by a deontic logic or 
algorithms for optimisation, discussed by Simon, which might well be appropriate to engineering 
design. 
Let me suggest five activities that define human-centred design.  
• Designers invent or conceive possible futures, including its artefacts that they may be able to 
bring about, imaginable worlds that would not come about naturally. A causally determined 
world and future, by contrast, would be evidence of nature’s work and of the absence (or 
irrelevance) of design activity. Artefacts are products of human agency. They do not grow on 
trees. Design is fundamentally tied to conceiving futures that could not come about without 
human effort. 
• Designers need to know how desirable these futures are to those who might inhabit them, and 
whether they afford diverse communities the spaces they require to make a home in them. 
Desirable futures reside in language, in communication, particularly between designers and 
the likely inhabitants of these futures. Evidence about understanding these worlds consists of 
the ability to articulate and rearticulate these futures for designers to take note. 
• Designers experiment with what is variable or could be changed, in view of the opportunities 
that variability could open up for them and others. Laws in the natural sciences, by contrast, 
state what does not vary – cannot be varied or has not been varied. The variability of interest 
to designers has more to do with people’s cultural commitments, habits, and values. Some 
variabilities are just not recognised, habits and values, some are actively resisted, and some 
are eagerly embraced. Probably the most important task for designers is to create possibilities 
that nobody has thought of and would not have considered without rhetorical interventions by 
a designer. These variables define a space of possible actions, a design space, as Phil Agre 
calls it [4]. A design space is an artefact, a human creation, not observed in nature. 
• Designers work out realistic paths, plans to proceed towards desirable futures. By realistic I 
mean that these paths include sufficient details and take account of currently available 
technologies and material resources, as well as the abilities of those who might pursue them. 
• Designers make proposals (of realistic paths) to those who could bring a design to fruition, to 
the stakeholders of a design. Proposals are stated in language. However, they go beyond mere 
specifications, suggestions for how to proceed or policies to implement. They must offer their 
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 addressees possibilities to realise their desires and coordinate their actions towards something 
worthwhile. As such, proposals must enrol stakeholders into a designer’s project. The ends 
that designers may have in mind do not need to be the same as the ones that stakeholders 
pursue – as long as the latter stay involved, at least part of the way. Without a network of 
supportive and creative stakeholders, a design cannot be realised. 
Some of the contradictions between what scientific researchers claim they do and what designers 
do are as follows. 
• Simon already recognised that the disciplines of the sciences are concerned with what exists 
whereas the disciplines of design are concerned with what, in his words, ‘ought to be’ [2]. In 
terms of this essay, whereas scientific theories are based only on what existed and could be 
observed prior to an analysis, design concerns artefacts that are not yet in use and could not 
have been observed, for which data are constitutively lacking, and experiences can at best be 
anticipated. 
• Whereas predictive theories that arise from scientific research conserve the status quo – 
constitutively assuming that the forces that operated in the past continue into the future – 
designers need to break with the determinisms of the past, proposing novel and untested paths 
into alternative futures, especially by involving the stakeholders’ creativity in realising a 
design. 
• Whereas researchers in the natural sciences privilege causal explanations, which excludes 
them as originators or contributors of the phenomena they observe, designers intend to affect 
something by their own actions, something that could not result from natural causes, thus 
defying the causal explanations of scientific discourse. 
• Whereas scientists celebrate generalisations, abstract theories or general laws, supported by 
evidence in the form of observational data, designers suggest courses of action that must 
ultimately work in all of their necessary details and in the future. Artefacts never work in the 
abstract. This contradiction is also manifest in scientists’ preference for abstract mathematical 
explanations, and designers’ preference for images, figurative models and prototypes. 
• Whereas researchers theorise invariancies, treating unexplained variations as undesirable 
noise, designers are concerned with variabilities, conditions that could be changed by design. 
Something analogue to Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle applies to this 
incompatibility. By focusing on what exists, researchers cannot possibly observe what could 
but has not yet been altered; by focusing on what could be altered, designers have no reason 
to care for why something had stayed the same. For these reasons scientific theories are not 
particularly interesting to designers – unless the theory describes something that designers do 
not care to change or need to build on. 
• Whereas researchers are concerned with the truth of their propositions, established by 
observational evidence, designers are concerned with the plausibility and compellingness of 
their proposals, which resides in stakeholders’ ability to rearticulate them in the context of the 
futures they desire and various paths to reach them. 
• Whereas scientific researchers seek knowledge for its own sake, value-free, and without 
regard to their utility, designers value knowledge that improves the world, at least in the 
dimensions related to their designs. 
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 • Whereas theories in science describe nature as unable to understand how it is being 
investigated, theories of design address the activities of designers who can understand not 
only what they are doing but also theories about what they are doing. As Wolfgang Jonas 
notes: ‘Any theory of designing has to include the generation of theories of designing’ as 
followed by its practitioners … and ‘explain its own emergence …its own change.’ [5], p. 
184. Thus, a research-based theory of designing could never keep up with the changes that 
designers introduce into their own subject matter. 
Obviously, design and research are incommensurable in conception. They pursue unlike 
epistemologies, at least in regard to the above. “Design research” is an oxymoron without 
question. As a subspecies of research, design research suppresses design. 
 
As re-search stifles design, what inquiries could improve design practices? 
Unquestionably, design re-search cannot support what designers need to practise. But what would 
be a more appropriate alternative? How and into what should designers inquire? The Semantic 
Turn (p. 209ff) proposes a science for design, which is meant to support what designers need to 
do to make their claims compelling [1]. A science for design is distinct from a ‘science of design, 
…that body of work which attempts to improve our understanding of design through “scientific” 
(i.e. systematic and reliable) methods of investigation’ [6], p. 96. The latter is exemplified by the 
scholarship of art historians, sociologists of design, or theorists of technology, all of whom 
generalise dominant features of design, historical trends, psychological predispositions, or socio-
cultural contingencies. Observing from outside the process, a science of design depicts designers 
as being causally determined by forces not under their control, and can contribute little to the 
practice of designing. A science for design is also not to be confused with a ‘design science … an 
explicitly organised, rational and wholly systematic approach to design; not just the utilisation of 
scientific knowledge of artefacts, but design in some sense a scientific activity itself’ [6]. A 
science for design raises questions from within the practices of design. I will spell out some of 
them. 
First and fundamentally, designers create possibilities. Possibilities relate to what humans can 
do. Possibilities are not part of and cannot be observed in a nature void of humans. A science for 
design must nurture ways that enlarge the design space within which designers act. Some of these 
ways are psychological, freeing oneself from blind spots and cognitive traps. Some are social, 
making use of conceptions held by others, when brainstorming, for instance. Some are 
technological, expanding a design space combinatorially, using computers, to generate 
alternatives that easily escape cognition. Some are perspectival, approaching a design from 
multiple disciplinary perspectives, and some are morphological, suggesting transformations into 
alternative representations with different qualities. All of these ways expand the range of choices 
available to designers (before narrowing them to a workable proposal). Re-search, as discussed 
above, is driven by extracting certainties from diverse data. Design, by contrast, thrives on 
uncertainty that designers can create and handle. 
Designers must be non-dogmatic and anti-authoritarian in order to question the ‘findings’ of 
scientific re-search. Blindly accepting scientific authority means surrendering to what existed in 
the past. Undoubtedly, there are limits to what design can accomplish. For example, I would be 
hesitant to invest in a proposal for a perpetual motion machine. It violates the second law of 
thermodynamics. But even laws of nature are human artefacts. They may have withstood the test 
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 of time, but we can never know whether the findings of the natural sciences are valid in the time 
frame of a design. The history of design is full of examples where scientists claimed 
impossibilities that designers managed to circumvent or prove wrong. Scientists once assured us 
that it was impossible for humans to fly and now we do. Engineers calculated that the steel 
wheels of locomotives on steel tracks would not have enough traction to pull a train, and they 
were wrong. In the 1950s, IBM researchers are reputed to have concluded that the world would 
need no more than five computers. This did not discourage Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs, 
working in a California garage, to develop the first personal computer. In effect, designers need 
to question prevailing ontological beliefs. Being afraid of undermining common convictions 
makes for timid designs. Proposing what everyone knows or already uses is not design at all. 
Designers must vigorously examine their own methods. Design science, as Cross defines it, 
institutes design methods, supposed to be scientific, and hence unquestionable [6]. Legitimising 
some practices and delegitimising others is the mark of a discipline. Disciplines discipline their 
disciples. Design, however, is an undiscipline, one that should be able to question anything and 
be allowed to try everything – provided its products are useful, work, and benefit others. But it 
should especially apply to itself. 
Designers must inquire into how to create variables, things that can be altered by design. They 
need to learn to create what scientists mostly abhor: changes that cannot be explained by natural 
causes. Variability, the ability to vary something, is an exclusively human ability. Just as JJ 
Gibson’s ‘affordances’ [7], variability is a relational concept, relating human agency to the 
environment; to what can be done with something. As already mentioned, inquiries into variables 
render knowledge of what exists less relevant than the options that variations open up. There are 
physical constraints, of course. Artefacts may ‘object’ to how they are treated by falling apart or 
just not doing what their users had in mind for them. When invariancies are social or cultural, 
designers need to explore what it takes to unfreeze cherished habits or convictions, or to get 
people to learn something new. Inquiries into variability require interactions with people, not 
more observations. They differ from ethnographic fieldwork of what users do, market research of 
user preferences, and ergonomic studies of the efficiency of human interfaces with technology. 
The latter describe what people do, not what they can do. 
Above all, designers participate in stakeholder networks and need to know how to support such 
networks and energise them with compelling proposals. I have already suggested that design 
must remain undisciplined but it cannot be totally free when it intends to succeed. For designers, 
success means enrolling stakeholders into the project of their design. This is what keeps design 
responsive to the conceptions, desires and capabilities of others, and it ‘disciplines’ the 
necessarily unruly design professionals – but not from within the profession. Unable to rely on 
data from a desirable future and without actual experiences of what is being proposed, designers 
need to know what makes their proposals compelling. Elsewhere, I have outlined several 
approaches to this effect [1]. I cannot reiterate them here except to say that designers need to 
inquire into the conceptual abilities of diverse stakeholders through processes of exchanging 
narratives with them about possible futures. Consequently, because design becomes real in 
communication with others, inquiries into what makes a proposal compelling are inquiries into 
how people understand and act on narratives pertaining to desirable worlds. Some scholars have 
suggested that design is an ethical enterprise. If designers realise that they cannot go alone, 
cannot force their conceptions onto others, and that whatever they propose must resonate with 
stakeholder conceptions [8], the questions that designers need to ask are implicitly ethical. The 
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 only ethical principle I would add is to avoid monopolising design in a profession and instead 
delegate the practice to as many stakeholders as possible. Design is a basic human activity to 
which everyone should have access. Professional designers must not usurp the ability of other 
stakeholders to design their own futures. Proposals for designs may fail for all kinds of reasons, 
and systematically studying why they failed is an important source of changing design practices 
from within. 
I suppose most of these suggestions for inquiries in preparation of design activity do not conform 
to what traditional designers do when they say they do research. Let me mention three traditional 
kinds and explore their value.  
First, surveying useful ideas for how a particular problem might be solved. Genrich Altshuller et 
al. surveyed some 200,000 patents and found 77% utilised something already existing within the 
inventor’s field [9]. 18% imported ideas from other areas. 4% realised new concepts, and only 
1% pioneered landmark inventions. The problem of the first 95% is to find something that 
already exists but elsewhere. While surveys of this kind might prevent reinventions or enable 
designers to creatively deviate from what is already known, they do not say anything about how 
these ideas could be utilised and are, hence, not about design practices. 
Second, designers often start by trying to understand how an artefact is to function. Indeed, 
designers tend to spend much time exploring what they are asked to do, for example, by taking 
the current version of a product apart, observing how it is used in different situations, visiting the 
manufacturer, talking to sales representatives etc. Louis Sullivan’s widely cited slogan form 
follows function abbreviates the common but naïve belief that the form of a product that 
designers need to find automatically follows from a thorough understanding of its function. 
However, understanding is not what re-search can provide, and deep understanding does not 
automatically lead to ideal forms. In fact, that deeper understanding of how something needs to 
work can limit a designer’s attention to the cosmetics of what already exists – a rather minimal 
design contribution. Sometimes, starting naively or from scratch can prevent one from being 
boxed into what clients and users expect designers to deliver. 
Third, there is one area where re-search in the sense described above can make valuable 
contributions and that is by pretesting a design. In the context of designers having to make 
proposals to those who matter, we need to realise that proposals are linguistic constructions 
whose compellingness usually depends on extralinguistic devices: sketches, models, diagrams 
and demonstrations, but they can also be enhanced by empirical evidence that a design works as 
claimed. Approximations to that future evidence may be obtained by observing prototypes in 
action, how targeted users respond to and benefit from a design. Valuable as this kind of re-
search is, it can be conducted only after a design is at least provisionally complete. Pretesting is 
necessarily limited to parts of a stakeholder network, perceived bottlenecks, typically users. 
Pretests merely approximate the ultimate realisation of a design. 
 
Hiding design in the process of scientific inquiries 
What researchers claim they do is not the whole story and what is missing reveals their blind 
spots. Let me discuss two and end by suggesting a less delusionary epistemology for scientific 
inquiry, including research design. 
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 First, the metaphorical language of the accepted accounts of scientific research prevents 
acknowledgements of the researchers’ agency. As above noted, researchers speak of research 
results as findings, discoveries, or truths – as if the phenomena they describe had been there to 
begin with, theories were hiding themselves in the data, laws would govern nature, making the 
task of scientific research one of uncovering what is behind the observable surface of nature. But 
patterns must be recognised before their pervasiveness can be tested. Re-cognition – cognising 
something again – implicates a long history of the researchers’ conceptions. Researchers’ 
conceptual involvement cannot be avoided by delegating pattern recognition to mechanical 
devices, to systematic analyses or statistical tests. Such mechanisms, meant to assure objectivity, 
are always designed by someone and, hence, are representative of its designers’ conceptual 
repertoire, and what they indicate must be re-cognisable as well. 
It follows that re-search results are not the properties of data alone, as claimed, but of how the 
data fit a researcher’s conceptual and linguistic vocabulary. The difference between outstanding 
and normal scientists lies in the former’s ability to ask interesting questions, generate relevant 
data, and describe their implications in convincing terms. This is not to suggest that research 
results are subjective, but that so-called findings are the product of interactions between the data 
and their treatment. Privileging the properties of data at the expense of the researchers’ role as the 
creators of hypotheses, proponents of theories, and designers of systems of analysis denies 
human agency in the products of science. The skilful design of research by scientists thus 
becomes the victim of the epistemological commitment to objectivity, the illusion of being able 
to observe without an observer [10] or to re-search without the cognitive and linguistic histories 
of the researchers. 
Second, in order to preserve the abstract-objectivist [11] or representational [12] conception of 
scientific (propositional) language, the accepted accounts of scientific research deny or omit the 
context in which re-search takes place. This may be demonstrated with Bruno Latour and Steve 
Woolgar’s (1986) five-stage model of scientific discoveries [13], schematically stated as follows: 
(1) document 
(2)  document  →  object 
(3)  document    |   object 
(4)  document  ←  object 
(5) ‘deny (or forget about) stages 1–3’ 
Based on ethnographic studies of scientific practices in research laboratories, astronomical 
observatories and other scientific enterprises, Latour and Woolgar noted that virtually all research 
starts with (1) documents: the literature of the discipline in which problems are identified as 
legitimate targets of investigation; lucrative requests for research proposals; or puzzling gaps in 
research results published by colleagues. 
In a second step, such verbal matter gives rise to and defines an object of investigation: (2) 
document→object. In statistics, this step means identifying a population that can be sampled with 
suitable instruments. In physics, it nowadays means building very expensive apparatus to run 
theory-informed experiments that yield novel observations. In psychology, experiments with 
subjects are typical. They induce individual behaviours pertaining to a research question that 
might not occur in everyday life. Public opinion researchers design surveys and interview 
schedules through which publics are constructed that are of interest to candidates for political 
office or policy makers in government [14]. This step generates data that would not exist 
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 otherwise. Researchers do not merely stumble upon data. Data are made, which prompts 
Herminia Alfonso to call them ‘poieta’ [15]. Scientific literature is full of how-to books on the 
design of experiments, of measuring instruments, of questionnaires, of coding instructions, and of 
transcription conventions. Even when data are produced by a process not controlled by the 
scientist, recognising them as data makes all the difference. 
The third step involves separating the data from what caused them: (3) document | object. To 
justify this split, a variety of devices are in use, for example, for preventing experimenter biases 
from polluting the data, relying on objective measuring instruments, or admitting data to an 
analysis only when their inter-coder agreement is high. While such devices assure that the data 
are reproducible, that the method of generating them is not affected by spurious causes, none of 
these precautions can change the fact that the data could not exist without the application of a 
design that generates these data. 
The fourth step inverses the original direction of the causality: (4) document←object, now 
treating the data as selecting among hypotheses or judging the validity of a theory of interest to 
the researcher. This is the step that researchers in the sciences treat methodologically, and it also 
is the step described above as the re-search process. 
The fifths and final step, (5) ‘deny (or forget about) stages 1–3,’ leaves step (4), re-search, as the 
accepted way of describing scientific research, effectively supporting the claim that research 
results represent phenomena existing in nature. Woolgar 1993 suggests [16]: 
‘Step (5) rewrites history so as to give the discovered object its ontological 
foundation. …Construing the prior existence of the object entails the portrayal of 
the observer as passive rather than active. We thus see the rhetorical importance 
of the antecedence of the object in the way it implicates a particular conception of 
the agent (as)… merely peripheral and transitory. It is as if observers merely 
stumble upon a pre-existing scene.’ (p. 69) 
One might be lenient and argue that steps (1) to (3) take less time or are easier to perform than 
step (4). However, ignoring the design phase of scientific research and the agency of the 
researcher/observer is no oversight. It is necessary to preserve the idea of representation, the 
belief that research probes reality the way it is. I take this the primary motivation of step (5). 
Suppose we were to ignore the devious step (5) instead of (1) to (3). What difference would this 
make? Obviously, it would acknowledge the history of the re-search process. More importantly, 
it would require a significant shift in the epistemology of science from a representational 
enterprise to a constructive one. I want to build on Heisenberg’s famous assertion: ‘What we 
observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning.’ Our method of 
questioning points to the discourse in which we construct our worlds and ask our questions about 
these worlds. The answers we obtain reveal nothing other than whether our own actions, taken in 
view of our constructions, are afforded or fail to be afforded by whatever resides outside of us. 
Consequently, scientific work does not reveal what exists (in perpetuity or in fact), but what our 
constructions of the world had enabled us to do – the data we were able to generate to test the 
hypotheses we designed. While this brings science and design closer to each other, the past tense 
in the last sentence is of utmost importance in distinguishing between the two. Science articulates 
the constructions that worked so far. Design articulates constructions that might work in the 




Re-search as practised today cannot possibly serve as a model for generating knowledge about 
design or to improve design. In fact, relying on re-search, being necessarily conservative, would 
condemn design to elaborations of the past. Even my modest suggestion to acknowledge 
scientists as designers of research processes does not go far enough. 
Inquiries that could inform design practices would have to start by acknowledging the simple fact 
that design is concerned with how we may want to live in future worlds. At any one moment in 
time, these futures reside in narratives that are sufficiently compelling to coordinate the 
stakeholders in these futures and encourage them to do their best to make them real. Whereas 
science concerns conceptions that worked so far, design concerns what could work in the future, 
a future that is more interesting than what we know today. A design is always a proposal, a 
conjecture. Whether it delivers what it promises, whether it will work in the foreseeable future, 
cannot be known until it ceases to be a design and becomes part of its users’ history. At any one 
moment in time, the viability of a design depends on its stakeholders’ conceptions, commitments 
and resources, which can be studied in order to inform design decisions. This is what inquiries in 
support of design need to do. They must not become entrapped by a debilitating oxymoron. 
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